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THE  EMPIRICAL INVESTMENT literature  is full of disappointments.  From 
time to time waves of new ideas challenge the aggregate investment 
equation,  but these challenges are rarely  successful, and  progress  is, at 
best, slow. There are serious theoretical obstacles, stemming mostly 
from  the richness  of the cross-sectional  and  time-series  scenarios  faced 
by actual  investors, from  the complexity  of the investment  technologies 
available to them, and from the myriad  incentive problems  that these 
economic agents face. There are at least as complex, and perhaps  in- 
surmountable,  data problems. Both right- and left-hand  side variables 
are seldom measured  properly.  ' 
In spite of this pessimistic picture, this paper  makes a new attempt. 
By building from the microeconomic actions of individual plants, it 
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aims to highlight some of the landmarks  on the path leading from 
microeconomic  investment  decisions to aggregate  investment  dynam- 
ics.  The story that emerges from this experiment does not seem to 
challenge common sense as much as do most contributions  to this 
literature. 
The starting  point of the paper  is motivated, but not limited, by the 
literature  on aggregation  of lumpy and discontinuous  microeconomic 
investment. It is difficult to argue with the claim that constraints  to 
adjustment  faced by individual production  units depart significantly 
from  the constraints  implicit in the workhorse  quadratic  adjustment  cost 
model. Technological and market-induced  irreversibilities,  as well as 
indivisibilities and other forms of increasing  returns  (nonconvexities) 
in the adjustment  technology, are more likely the norm  than  the excep- 
tion.2  The pattern  of microeconomic  investment  that  emerges  from  such 
constraints, contrary to the implications of the quadratic  adjustment 
model, is highly nonlinear.  Periods  of more or less passive investment 
response  to shocks are  followed by feverish  reactions  not only to present 
but also to accumulated  shocks.3 
In reality, the fortunes and actions of individual  units are very im- 
perfectly synchronized. When combined with the nonlinear  nature  of 
the investment  policies described above, this leads to a nontrivial  ag- 
gregation problem;  the representative  agent model is not suitable for 
the task. Giuseppe  Bertola  and  Ricardo  Caballero  model  the aggregation 
problem  of firms facing idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks when in- 
vestment is irreversible.  They estimate the model and find broad  con- 
formity with aggregate U.S.  manufacturing  data. More recently, Ca- 
ballero and Eduardo  Engel have generalized this to a broader  set of 
nonlinear  microeconomic  policies which, at the aggregate  level, nest 
2.  Sources of convexity do exist, however, especially at the large firm  and market 
levels. Some of the most important  ones are time-to-build,  constraints  to credit, and 
market  equilibrium  forces; but these are complementary  to, rather  than substitutes  of, 
the nonconvexities  emphasized  here. 
3.  There have been extensive recent  developments  in the microeconomic  literature 
on (S,s) models. See Harrison,  Sellke, and Taylor (1983) for a technical  discussion of 
impulse  control  problems.  For  a good survey  of the economics  literature  on this problem 
(although  with an emphasis  on models where investment  is infrequent  but not lumpy) 
see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). See also Abel and Eberly  (1994) for an elegant charac- 
terization  of models that combine infrequent  (but not lumpy) adjustment  with convex 
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the linear dynamics of the standard  quadratic  adjustment  cost model. 
Using two-digit (aggregate)  postwar  U.S. manufacturing  data,  they find 
a dramatic  improvement  in the performance  of (S,s)-type models over 
linear ones. The main reason behind this gain is that the aggregate 
counterpart  of the microeconomic nonlinearities  described above is a 
time-varying  elasticity of aggregate  investment  with respect  to shocks. 
The histogram  of accumulated  shocks across production  units becomes 
an important  state variable. If the history  of shocks and  microeconomic 
actions is such that many production  units are about  to enter a feverish 
state  of investment,  then  aggregate  investment  becomes very  responsive 
to further  shocks. This additional  flexibility is needed to explain the 
high skewness and kurtosis  of aggregate  investment  time series.4 
Microeconomic  evidence also seems supportive  of this view of ag- 
gregate  investment  dynamics. Mark  Doms and  Timothy  Dunne study a 
large group of manufacturing  plants from the Longitudinal  Research 
Database (LRD) and document that investment spikes account for a 
large  fraction  of the investment  of these plants. Furthermore,  they show 
that the number  of plants undergoing  primary  spikes exhibits strong 
positive correlation  with aggregate  investment  cycles. Russell Cooper, 
John Haltiwanger,  and Laura  Power go one step further  and find that 
the probability  of an investment spike for a plant increases with the 
time that has elapsed since the previous spike, lending additional  sup- 
port to the view of  a microeconomic environment  characterized  by 
nonconvexities in the adjustment  technology.5 
This paper integrates  the organizing framework  of the aggregation 
literature  and the microeconomic data of the LRD. It organizes data 
from a large sample of continuously  operating  plants in the U.S. man- 
ufacturing  sector for the period 1972-88  (that is very similar to the 
sample  used by Doms and  Dunne)  in a way that  is useful for understand- 
ing aggregate investment dynamics. Indeed, the final product is an 
aggregate  investment  equation  that  has aggregate  equipment  investment 
on the left-hand  side and not only aggregate, but also microeconomic 
4.  See Bertola  and Caballero  (1994) and Caballero  and Engel (1994). Bar-Ilan  and 
Blinder  (1992) make  a similar  point in a different  context, observing  that  the number  of 
consumers  purchasing  cars is an important  explanatory  variable  for aggregate  durable 
purchases. 
5.  See Doms and Dunne (1993) and  Cooper, Haltiwanger,  and Power (1995). 4  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
variables  on the right-hand  side. Throughout  the paper we attempt  to 
explain equipment  investment. For purposes  of brevity, we often omit 
the term "equipment" and simply refer to "investment." 
This equation, and the process of building it, leads to several con- 
clusions: 
-Measures  of shocks faced by plants reveal large long-run  elastic- 
ities of investment  with respect  to cost of capital. These elasticities vary 
from about -0.01  for transportation  to  -2.0  for textiles, with an 
average  of around  -  1.0, the neoclassical benchmark. 
-Over  the short run the responses are substantially  smaller and 
variable  over time; they range from 0.07 to 0.12 of the corresponding 
long-run  elasticities. 
-The  variability  of this aggregate  elasticity comes from  the nonlin- 
earity in microeconomic policies,  which indicates that plants adjust 
substantially  more to large shortages  of capital than  to small ones, and 
that  they are more likely to tolerate  excesses of capital than shortages; 
this behavior  at the plant  level is not exclusive of, but is quite  consistent 
with irreversibility  plus increasing  returns  in the adjustment  technology. 
-The  tax reforms  of the 1980s had substantial  impact  on equipment 
investment, positive in 1981 and large and negative from 1986. 
-The  effect of the 1986 reform  was exacerbated  by a large  elasticity 
with respect to shocks that had been brought about by the preceding 
expansion. 
-Fluctuations  in microeconomic policies  also played a role in 
explaining aggregate investment during the sample period. This was 
particularly  true during election years. Other things equal, investors 
seemed overly reluctant  when Presidents  Carter  and Bush were elected 
and optimistic when President  Reagan was first  elected. 
Organizing Framework 
Working  with large microeconomic  data sets can be overwhelming, 
especially for macroeconomists.  These data sets contain so much in- 
formation,  so many details that  could be of interest,  that  the number  of 
ways in which the data can be explored is almost limitless. There is a 
constant danger of the analysis going astray. In order to reduce this 
risk, this paper  follows an organizing  framework  that proved  useful in R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  5 
an earlier  study that analyzed  the closely related  problem  of aggregate 
employment  dynamics, building from the actions of, more or less, the 
same plants.6 
The approach  rests on the simple observation  that capital is seldom 
at its "desired" level when adjustment  costs are of any importance. 
The organizing framework  has two basic elements, both of which are 
functions of an index, x, that measures  the deviation between desired 
and actual  (from hereon, natural  log of) capital stock at the plant  level. 
That is, x is the investment  rate "mandated" by investment  theory if 
adjustment  costs are momentarily removed (mandated investment).7 
Positive values of x reflect capital shortages, while negative values 
correspond  to excess capital. This section takes mandated  investment 
as given and  describes  the accounting  part  of the organizing  framework, 
which relates  microeconomic  actions  to aggregate  investment.  The the- 
ory and  measurement  of mandated  investment  are  explained  in the next 
section. 
One basic element of the organizing  framework  captures  locations: 
The cross-section of plants' mandated  investment  immediately  before 
the capital stock adjustments  of period  t is denoted  byf(x,t), so that  the 
fraction  of plants  with mandated  investment  between  x and (x +  Ax) is 
approximately  equal to f(x,t)Ax. The other basic element captures  ac- 
tions: For every time period, we group together plants with similar 
mandated  investment before adjustment  and calculate the fraction of 
mandated  investment that is, on average, actually undertaken  by the 
plants  within each of these groups. The resulting  function  is called the 
6.  See Caballero,  Engel, and Haltiwanger  (1995). For our purposes  investment  and 
labor  demand  have in common that adjustment  costs play an important  role in shaping 
individual  plant dynamics, and that there is substantial  heterogeneity  in the history of 
individual  plants. 
The frequencies  at which adjustment  costs matter  differs  for labor  and  capital.  These 
costs seem to be important  for labor demand  at a quarterly  frequency,  but play only a 
secondary  role at lower frequencies, such as the annual  frequencies  considered  in this 
paper.  Thus  the analysis  of investment  decisions in the present  paper  assumes  that  labor 
is largely  flexible, and  the analysis  of labor  demand  in the other  paper,  to a large  extent, 
does not consider capital stock fluctuations.  Similarly, this paper  analyzes equipment 
investment  assuming  that investment  in structures,  at the level of a continuing  plant, is 
significantly  less frequent. 
7.  We owe this terminology  to Robert  Hall. Previous  versions  of this paper  followed 
the usual (S,s) terminology and sign convention, defining x as actual minus desired 
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adjustment rate function  (or simply, adjustmentfunction)  and is denoted 
by A(x,t). It follows that firms with mandated  investment  x have an 
average  investment  rate during  period t equal to xA(x,t).8 
Two equations are central to the approach  used in this paper. The 
first  relates individual  actions to aggregate  equipment  investment: 
(1)  I,-t  xA(x,  t)f(x,  t)dx. 
The right-hand  side of the above expression sums average investment 
rates for plants over all possible mandated investment; the sum is 
weighted by the cross-section of plants' mandated  investment  imme- 
diately before the adjustments  of period t. If investment  rates are in- 
dependent  of the stock of capital  before adjustment,  so that  the average 
and aggregate  investment  rates  coincide, then  It is equal  to the standard 
aggregate  investment-to-capital  ratio. We make the independence  as- 
sumption  and refer to It as the aggregate  equipment  investment  rate.9 
This accounting framework  is quite general. In the simplest case, 
when the adjustment  function, A(x,t), does not depend  on x, the partial 
adjustment  model results. At the aggregate level,  this has the same 
implications  as a quadratic  adjustment  costs model applied  to a repre- 
sentative agent.  10  In this case, and only in this case, knowing the first 
moment (that is,  the aggregate) of mandated  investment suffices to 
determine  the actual aggregate  investment  rate;  higher  moments  (other 
aspects) of the cross-section of mandated  investment  are not needed. 
Yet a departure  from this basic case will imply that other  character- 
istics of the cross-section of mandated  investment  than  its first  moment 
are needed to describe aggregate  investment. For example, if there  is a 
difference between the adjustment  costs of increasing and decreasing 
the capital  stock of plants, it might  be expected  that  A(x,t) would  behave 
differently  for negative and positive values of x. A simple adjustment 
8.  Again, we owe this terminology  to Robert  Hall. We used  to refer  to the adjustment 
rate  function  as the "hazard." The concept of the adjustment  function, in isolation, is 
silent with respect  to the way in which the average  adjustment  of plants  at x takes  place. 
For example, it could represent  all firms  adjusting  by the same small fraction,  or fewer 
plants  adjusting  by a larger  fraction  while the rest remain  inactive. 
9.  This assumption  is roughly  validated  by the data. A comparison  of the aggregate 
investment  rate implied by figure  3 and the mean investment  rate  depicted  in figure 10 
shows that they exhibit similar  variation  over time, with coincident  peaks and troughs. 
10. See Rotemberg  (1987). R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  7 
function  capturing  this asymmetry  lets A(x,t) equal a constant,  A-,  for 
negative x and another  (possibly larger) constant, A+, for positive x. 
The first  panel of figure 1 shows this adjustment  function  and  a possible 
cross-section of mandated  investment. From  equation  1 it follows that, 
in this case, aggregate investment  rates can be calculated  only if it is 
known what are the average investment  rates mandated  both for plants 
with negative x and for plants with positive x, and what is the fraction 
of plants in each group.1I  Knowing the first moment of mandated  in- 
vestment  is not enough to calculate aggregate  investment. 
Another  important  model of adjustment  costs is obtained  if A(x,t) is 
equal  to zero when x takes values between  S and  s, and  otherwise  equal 
to one, where S and s denote a negative and a positive constant, re- 
spectively. The second panel of figure 1 shows this other adjustment 
function and a possible cross-section of mandated  investment. This 
corresponds  to a two-sided (S,s)  policy with two thresholds  and a com- 
mon target.  12 Calculating  aggregate  investment  requires  knowing what 
fraction  of plants are to the left and right  of the inaction  range, and  the 
average  mandated  investment  of plants in each of these groups. 
More  generally, it seems unlikely that  plants  tolerate  small and  large 
deviations in their capital stock equally well, although  the degree of 
intolerance need not change as dramatically  as it does in the (S,s) 
model. A simple  example  of an increasing  adjustment  function  is X2x2.  13 
It follows from equation 1 that for this adjustment  function, aggregate 
investment  depends on the third moment of the cross-section of man- 
dated  investment.  Similarly, if the adjustment  function  is approximated 
by a k-th degree polynomial, aggregate  investment  will be a function 
of the first (k +  1) moments of the cross-section of mandated  invest- 
ment. Characterizations  of aggregate  investment  dynamics  in terms  of 
the evolution of the higher moments  of the cross-sectional  distribution 
of mandated  investment  are discussed further,  below. 
The second equation that is central to the approach  taken in this 
paper  is more involved than equation 1 because it describes  the evolu- 
11. Note that  the composition  of each group  varies over time. 
12. See, for example, Harrison,  Sellke, and  Taylor  (1983). 
13. More  generally,  an increasing  adjustment  rate  function  grows  with  the magnitude 
of plants' mandated  investment  rates, so that  A(x,t) is decreasing  for negative  values of 
x and increasing  for positive values of x. In earlier  work we referred  to this property  as 
the "increasing  hazard." Figure 1. Adjustment  Rate Function and Cross-Sectional  Distribution 
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Source: Authors' model as described in text. 
a. The adjustment rate is the ratio of actual investment to mandated investment, where mandated investment represents 
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tion of the cross-sectional  density of mandated  investment  as a function 
of the history of aggregate  and idiosyncratic  shocks, as well as of the 
history  of individual  responses  to these shocks. The timing of events is 
described here, while the corresponding  expressions are presented  in 
appendix  A. 
Figure  2 illustrates  the evolution of the cross-section  density  of man- 
dated  investment  during  period  t. Idiosyncratic  shocks  hit first,  followed 
by the aggregate  shock. The period concludes with adjustments  by the 
plants. The sum of idiosyncratic  and aggregate  shocks reflects a com- 
bination of  plant-specific and economywide depreciation, demand 
shocks, productivity  shocks, and cost of capital shocks. By construc- 
tion, the aggregate  shock leads to the same change in x for all plants, 
while idiosyncratic  shocks average  to zero across plants. 
The first panel of figure 2 shows how the cross-section density of 
mandated  investment at the beginning of period t evolves after the 
idiosyncratic  shocks have taken  place. In this panel  idiosyncratic  shocks 
are assumed normal, and independent  of plants' mandated  investment 
before the shock. The second panel shows how the aggregate shock 
shifts the cross-section of plants' mandated  investment. The cross- 
sectional  density  that  results  immediately  after  the aggregate  shock (and 
before plants adjust)  is thef(x,t) of equation 1. Finally, the third  panel 
shows the effect of capital stock adjustments  on the complete cross- 
section of mandated  investment.  For illustrative  purposes,  in this panel 
it is assumed that plants either adjust (almost) fully or not at all, and 
that the adjustment  function is quadratic.  The dashed line denotes the 
cross-section  of mandated  investment  before adjustments,  and  the dash- 
dotted  line is the cross-section after  plants  complete their  capital stock 
adjustments.  The "spike"  in the neighborhood  of x  =  0 reflects the 
plants that adjusted  their capital stocks, thus leaving their mandated 
investment  rates at approximately  zero. 
Data 
The analysis in this paper is conducted using a balanced panel of 
approximately  seven thousand  plants in the U.S. manufacturing  sector 
for the period 1972-88.  The data are a subset of the Longitudinal 
Research  Database,  representing  all large, continuously  operating  man- Figure 2. Evolution  of Distribution  of Mandated  Investment 
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ufacturing  plants  over the sample. The LRD is housed at the Center  for 
Economic Studies at the Bureau of the Census and was created by 
longitudinally linking the establishment-level data from the Annual 
Survey of Manufactures  (ASM). The data set includes information  on 
shipments, materials, inventories, employment, wages and salaries, 
fringe benefits, energy use,  cost of contract work, expenditures  on 
equipment  and structures,  retirements  of equipment  and  structures,  and 
book value of equipment  and structures.  A novel aspect of the present 
analysis of plant-level investment  dynamics is the use of data on both 
expenditures  and retirements  in order to study plant-level investment 
dynamics.  This makes  it possible to examine  both positive and  negative 
adjustments  at the plant level and, in turn, to consider the aggregate 
implications  of the plant-level adjustments.'4 
Investment and Capital 
Our  explicit treatment  of both positive and negative  capital  stock ad- 
justments  poses interesting  measurement  issues beyond  the typical  diffi- 
culties of estimating  real capital  stocks and associated  investment  rates. 
A detailed  description  of our methodology  is presented  in appendix  D, 
and a brief outline follows here. The standard  procedure  is to initialize 
the capital  stock for each plant  in some year and then generate  a capital 
stock series by the perpetual  inventory  method, using the deflated  new 
expenditures  and  depreciation  rates  published  by the Bureau  of Economic 
Analysis  (BEA). That  is, capital  stocks are measured  as 
(2)  K, =  (1  -  6,)K,t,  +  NI,, 
where K, is the real end-of-period  capital stock, 8, is the depreciation 
rate, and  NI, is real capital  expenditures.  However, in generating  plant- 
level capital stocks and investment rates that exploit the retirements 
data, it must  be recognized  that  the published  depreciation  rates  already 
14. Retirements  in the ASM reflect  the gross value of assets sold, retired,  scrapped, 
destroyed, and so forth. Retirements  data for equipment  and structures  are available 
annually  up to 1988, when the ASM terminated  collection due to the development  of 
the new Annual  Capital  Expenditure  Survey, and  this determines  the end of our sample. 
Our  use of the retirements  data  contrasts  with the recent  work  of Doms and  Dunne  ( 1993) 
and Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1995), who also study plant-level investment 
dynamics  using the LRD, but focus only on new expenditures  on equipment  and struc- 
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incorporate  retirements.  Specifically, the published  depreciation  rates 
reflect  two components:  the loss of efficiency of an asset over its service 
life, while the asset is in use, and the retirement  of the asset at the end 
of its service life.'5 For example, for a one-hoss-shay pattern,  depre- 
ciation entirely reflects retirements.  The following discussion denotes 
the first component of  depreciation the in-use depreciation and the 
second component, retirements. 
The procedure  used to estimate in-use depreciation  rates at the two- 
digit level is outlined in appendix D. These estimates are used in an 
appropriately  modified perpetual  inventory  method  to estimate capital 
stocks and investment rates. Specifically, for each asset the capital 
accumulation  equation is given by 
(3)  K, =  (1  -  86)K,  I +  NI,  -R, 
where 861  is  the in-use depreciation rate and R, is real retirements. 
Estimating  real retirements  is complicated, since the available  data  are 
based upon the gross book value of the disposition of the assets. We 
estimate  real  retirements  assuming  a FIFO  retirements  pattern  and  using 
the appropriate deflators and adjusted depreciation rates for each 
vintage. 
Examination  of equation  3 makes clear that treating  retirements  ex- 
plicitly is important  for a number  of reasons. First, it permits  separation 
of plant-level depreciation into in-use depreciation and retirements. 
Second, the actual  retirements  pattern  at the plant  level will, typically, 
exhibit patterns  quite different from the average service life distribu- 
tions used by the BEA to construct  depreciation  rates. Put differently, 
using equation 2 with plant-level data on expenditures  and two-digit 
data on depreciation  rates, instead of equation  3, can yield potentially 
large  measurement  error  in the evolution  of the capital  stock at the plant 
level, because the average service life distributions  are applied to all 
plants  in the same industry.  Third, without a measure  of retirements  it 
would be impossible to estimate the left-hand side of the adjustment 
function. 
Figure 3 depicts the aggregate properties  of the measured  rates of 
equipment  investment. For purposes of comparison,  the figure shows 
15. See Hulten  and Wykoff (1981) for extensive further  discussion  of the construc- 
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Figure 3. Aggregate  Investment  Rates in the Manufacturing  Sector, 1973-88 
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Source: The investment rate is based on authors' calculations using data from the ASM. The expenditure and retirement 
rates are based on authors' calculations using data from the LRD. 
the new equipment  investment  rate using published  aggregate  data for 
total manufacturing,  as well as the aggregate  expenditure  rate (expen- 
ditures over capital stock) and aggregate retirement  rate (retirements 
over capital  stock). The expenditure  rate  mimics the time-series  pattern 
of the published  rate quite closely. The retirement  rate averages  about 
4 percent and is relatively constant at the total manufacturing  level.'6 
The following analysis focuses on a plant-level investment  rate  of I, = 
(NI,  -  R,)/K,_,.  The rate can thus be either positive  or negative. 
Mandated Investment 
Each element of the right-hand  side of equation 1 depends on the 
deviations  between  desired  and  actual  capital  at the plant  level, xi,, such 
that 
vi=  kt 
- 
where  ki,  and  ki,_, represent  the natural  log of desired  and  actual  capital 
16. Thus one early result is that fluctuations  in aggregate  net investment  are domi- 
nated by fluctuations  in aggregate  expenditures,  rather  than in aggregate  retirements. 
The in-use depreciation  rate  component  of net investment  is not reported  in figure  3, but 
it is essentially  constant;  using our measurement  procedures,  it only varies  over time as 
a result  of changes in industry  composition. 14  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
in plant i at time t (before adjustment).  It should  be apparent  from this 
expression that mandated  investment is not easily measured. Besides 
the standard  problems of measuring capital (the second term in the 
definition  of x), it requires  constructing  a measure  of desired capital. 
The construction  of mandated  investment  is summarized  here and de- 
scribed  in detail in appendix  B. 
First, it is assumed that desired capital is proportional  to the stock 
of capital that the plant would hold in the absence of any frictions to 
adjustment,  k*, such that 
(4)  k, =  k,* +  di, 
where  di is a plant-specific  constant  to be determined  later  on. 17  Desired 
capital refers to the stock of capital that the firm  would hold if adjust- 
ment  costs were momentarily  removed;  frictionless  capital, on the other 
hand, refers to the stock of capital that the firm  would hold if it never 
faced adjustment  costs. Conceptually,  the latter  is a simpler  construct. 
Second, we let the frictionless stock of capital, k*, be determined 
by the standard  neoclassical expression, modified  to relax  the constraint 
that the elasticity with respect to cost of capital be equal to the output 
elasticity (Qi  unconstrained,  below). Aside from constants,  this expres- 
sion can be written  as 
(5)  k,* -ki,,  =  -qi,{(yi,  -  ki,)  -  OiciJ 
where  yi, and ci,, respectively, represent  the natural  log of the value of 
output  and the cost of capital in plant i at time t. I8 The parameter  'qi  is 
17. Bertola  and Caballero  (1994) show that this assumption  is consistent with the 
behavior  of a rational  plant  whose profit  function  is isoelastic and that  faces shocks that 
have independent  increments.  In this paper  we take this as a reasonable  approximation. 
18. The cost of capital  measure  we use is given by (r +  8,)T,(pi,Ip,)I(l  -  T,), where 
r is the real interest rate, 8, is the depreciation  rate, T, is one minus the sum of the 
investment  tax credit  and the present-discounted  value of depreciation  allowances,  pi, is 
the new capital expenditures  deflator  for equipment,  p, is the industry-output  deflator, 
and , is the corporate  tax rate. For  this measure  we assume  a constant  real interest  equal 
to 0.06,  and use the BEA two-digit depreciation  rates and the output  and new capital 
deflators  from the ASM published  data compiled by Wayne  Gray  and Eric Bartelsman 
(see Bartelsman  and Gray, 1995). We thank Kevin Hassett and Austan Goolsbee for 
providing, respectively, perfect-foresight  and myopic-expectations  versions of T, on a 
detailed  asset basis. We construct  two-digit  analogues  using an industry-asset  weighting 
matrix  provided  to us by the BEA. In empirically  implementing  equation  5, we use the 
projection  of the perfect-foresight-based  cost of capital measure  on the myopic-expec- 
tations-based  cost of capital measure  and a time trend. Details of the data  construction 
for the other  terms  and variables  in equation  5 are discussed in appendix  D. R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  15 
a decreasing  function  of the curvature  of the profit  function  with respect 
to capital, once flexible factors  have been optimized  over. Under  a wide 
range  of reasonable  assumptions  about  the cost share  of flexible factors 
and the elasticity of product  demand (see appendix  B for further  dis- 
cussion),  Ni can be approximated by  1/(1  -  oxi), where (xi is the cost 
share  of equipment  capital. 
Third, we estimate the cost of capital elasticities using the fact that 
the left-hand side of equation 5, which is equal to (xi, -  di), is likely 
to be stationary  (that  is, deviations  are  not likely to persist  indefinitely), 
while the elements on the right-hand  side of equation 5 are, individ- 
ually, very persistent. Thus 0i can be estimated from a cointegrating 
regression of the natural  log of the capital-to-output  ratio on cost of 
capital, and the resulting  coefficient can be interpreted  as the long-run 
elasticity of capital with respect to its cost. We do this imposing the 
constraints  that  these elasticities be equal  across  plants  within  each two- 
digit sector. Figure 4 reports the estimates obtained for each sector. 
These range  from -0.01  to -2.0,  with an average  at about -1.0,  the 
long-run  elasticity in the neoclassical model.  '9 The fourth  and last step 
is to estimate the plant-specific  constant  di. We let this constant  be the 
average gap between ki,-,  and k,*  for the five points with investment 
closest  to median investment (broadly interpreted as maintenance 
investment)  .20 
Thus  all the necessary  ingredients  are  available  to construct  estimates 
of desired capital and mandated  investment  at the plant level. 
19. Cointegration  regressions in models of adjustment  costs are subject to small 
sample biases that are increasing  with respect to the size of adjustment  costs. These 
biases are reduced  by adding lagged differences  of the right-hand  side variables  to the 
cointegrating  regression  (see Caballero, 1994, for a discussion  of this issue). With this 
purpose,  we include five lags of changes in cost of capital  on the right-hand  side of our 
regressions.  Our  results  are fairly robust  to modifications  in the number  of lags; perhaps 
this is because there is enough variation  in the four-digit  price deflator  used in the cost 
of capital  measure  that  two-digit samples are, effectively, quite large. 
Estimates  of the long-run  cost of capital elasticity are quite robust  to changes in 
particular  measures  of cost of capital  and levels of aggregation.  For example, using the 
same procedure  on aggregate  manufacturing  data alone, Bertola  and Caballero  (1994) 
and  Caballero  (1994) also obtain  estimates  of the long-run  elasticity  of equipment  capital 
to cost of capital shocks of around  minus one. 
20.  The results reported  below are robust  to a variety  of procedures  for estimating 
di, including  estimating  it as an industry-specific  (as opposed to a plant-specific)  con- 
stant. This allowed us to use procedures  similar to those described in the text, or 
alternatively,  regression-based  procedures  with the pooled data. 16  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 4. Long-Run  Response  to the Cost of CapitalP 
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a. Plant-level data for industries 20 and 21 are pooled in estimation, constraining the elasticities for these two industries 
to be the same. 
Shocks 
For  the purposes  of this paper,  shocks  to plants  correspond  to changes 
in productivity, demand, or cost of capital that lead to changes in 
desired  capital. From equations  4 and 5, 
Qkit= 
-  ki  {Q(yit-  a,  I1)  -  0i4cc}. 
With some abuse of terminology, the first term on the right-hand  side 
of this expression can be referred  to as the profitability  component  of 
the shock and the last term, as the cost of capital component. The 
aggregates corresponding  to these shocks are defined as the average 
across all plants at each point in time. Figure 5 plots these aggregate 
shocks. The solid line corresponds  to the cost of capital component, 
which clearly reflects the favorable  effect of the tax reform  during  the R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  17 
Figure 5. Components  of Aggregate  Shocks to the Mandated  Investment-to-Capital 
Ratio, 1974-88 
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early 1980s, as well as the large adverse  cost of capital shock brought 
about by the tax reform of  1986.2' The dotted line portrays  the pro- 
cyclical pattern  of the path of the profitability  component  of the shock. 
Figure 5 also shows that, at the aggregate  level, both components  are 
about  equally important.  This contrasts  with microeconomic-level  data 
in which the profitability  component is an order of magnitude  more 
volatile than the cost of capital component.22 
21.  As described  above, the cost of capital  measure  is based  on the projection  of the 
perfect-foresight  cost of capital measure  on a myopic measure.  We have also examined 
the results  using the perfect-foresight  measure.  To a large  extent, our results  are robust 
to this alternative.  The main exception is for the mid-1980s. In terms  of figure  5, the 
less myopic version  exhibits more  of an increase  in the cost of capital  in 1984 and 1985 
which, for subsequent  results, implies that  the 1986 tax reform  has a somewhat  (but  not 
dramatically)  smoother  impact  on aggregate  investment. 
22.  The ratio  of the variance  of the aggregate  profitability  component  to the variance 
of the aggregate  cost of capital  component  is close to one. The median  of the same ratio 
at the plant  level is about  ten (we only have four-digit  data  for cost of capital, but  there 
is not much margin  to increase the variance  of cost of capital at more disaggregated 
levels). 18  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Diagnostic 
Before plunging  into the analysis suggested  by the organizing  frame- 
work  described  above, it is useful to describe  a few features  of the data 
that  are suggestive of the relevance  of that  framework.  For  this purpose 
we construct  standardized  measures  of plant-level  investment-to-capital 
ratios, shocks, and mandated  investment  rates. For each of the varia- 
bles,  we subtract from the original observations the corresponding 
plant-level  mean, and  divide this difference  by the corresponding  plant- 
level standard  deviation. 
The first  panel of figure  6 depicts the histogram  of plant-level stand- 
ardized  investment-to-capital  ratios. It is apparent  from this figure  that 
microeconomic  investment  has both skewness and high kurtosis. This 
observation  has been made  before, for a similar  sample;  it holds true  at 
more aggregate levels; and it has often been considered  as suggestive 
of the presence of nonconvexities in the adjustment  technologies (fat 
tails indicate the presence of a large fraction  of large adjustments).23 
An alternative  explanation is that skewness and large kurtosis are 
inherited  directly from the shocks affecting plants. The second panel 
of figure  6 invalidates  the latter  claim by showing that the distribution 
of the plant-level standardized  shocks does not exhibit nearly  as much 
skewness  and  kurtosis  as the distribution  of investment-to-capital  ratios. 
Finally, the third panel shows that the standardized  distribution  of 
mandated  investment  rates exhibits negative, rather  than positive, ex- 
cess kurtosis. Since mandated  investments are a form of storage for 
shocks to which plants have not yet adjusted, and since actions have 
positive kurtosis while shocks do not (or have less),  the "leftover" 
component  of these shocks must  have negative  kurtosis.  The significant 
differences in the distributions  described in the three panels, together 
with the near-normality  of distribution  of shocks, invalidate  the stan- 
dard quadratic  adjustment  cost model, in which both investment-to- 
capital  ratios  and mandated  investments  are linear  combinations  of pre- 
vious shocks.24 
23.  In regard  to a similar sample, see Doms and Dunne (1993) and Cooper, Halti- 
wanger, and Power (1995); at a more aggregate  level see, for example, Caballero  and 
Engel (1994) for two-digit manufacturing  evidence. 
24.  These simple observations  do not deny the possibility  that  microeconomic  units 
are following a probabilistic  partial  adjustment  model which also has linear aggregate Figure 6. Histograms  of Standardized  Variablesa 
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a.  For each of the variables, we standardize by subtracting a plant-level mean and dividing by the plant-level standard 
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Figure 7. Excess Kurtosis, 1973-88 
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a. The difference between the sample kurtosis and 3, the kurtosis of the normal distribution. 
Figure  7 provides the dynamic  counterpart  of figure  6 by portraying 
the path  of the excess kurtosis  coefficient of the standardized  variables. 
It is apparent  from  this figure  that  the standardized  investment-to-capital 
ratio has larger  cross-sectional kurtosis  than do shocks and deviations 
and that, except for a mild trend, the movements  in kurtosis  of invest- 
ment and shocks are mostly uncorrelated  (a correlation  of 0.24).25 
Main Results 
Understanding  the forces behind aggregate investment dynamics, 
with their occasional bursts and busts, requires  characterizing  each of 
the elements of equation 1. Of particular  interest are the shape of the 
dynamics  (see Calvo, 1983). However, when we go on to impose the structure  of the 
organizing  framework,  we show that  the partial  adjustment  model is not consistent  with 
the data  either. 
25.  It is also apparent  from comparing  figures  6 and 7 that at each year depicted  in 
figure  7, mandated  investment  has less excess kurtosis  than the overall excess kurtosis 
in figure  6. This difference  is due to the effects of aggregate  shocks, which are removed 
for figure  7 but  not for figure  6 (on the distribution  of standardized  mandated  investment). R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  21 
adjustment  function, its interaction  with fluctuations  in the cross-sec- 
tional density, and the origins of these fluctuations. 
Microeconomic  Adjustment 
The first  panel of figure  8 illustrates  the average  adjustment  function 
over time as a function  of mandated  investment.26  Bearing  in mind  that 
the right-hand  side of the figure  illustrates  situations  of capital  shortage, 
it is apparent  that, on average, plants with relatively large shortages 
adjust proportionally  more than do plants with small shortages. This 
feature  of an increasing  adjustment  rate  is akin  to-although  not exclu- 
sive  of-what  is found in models  where adjustment is optimally 
bunched  due to a nonconvexity in the adjustment  technology, such as 
a fixed cost. This seems largely realistic, and is quite consistent with 
the findings  of skewness and  fat tails for  the cross-section  of investment- 
to-capital  ratios  reported  above. The left-hand  side of the figure, which 
shows the region where capital is in excess, portrays  a fairly flat and 
small adjustment  rate that is reminiscent of irreversibility  of invest- 
ment.27 
The second panel contains  supportive  material.  The dashed  line por- 
trays the average cross-sectional density of mandated  investment. It 
clearly establishes the fact that  the nonconstant  segments  of the adjust- 
ment function occur in ranges where there is a significant  number  of 
observations. The solid line,  on the other hand, represents average 
expected investment for plants with any given level of mandated  in- 
vestment. The nonlinear features of the adjustment  function shown 
in the first panel are now reflected in the convex nature  of expected 
investment. 
For each level of mandated  investment, the adjustment  function is 
an average across adjustments  of different sizes. The third  and fourth 
panels of figure 8 show histograms  of conditional  adjustments  for high 
(over 80 percent  of desired capital) and low (between 5 and 20 percent 
26.  The depicted  adjustment  function  corresponds  to a cubic spline fitted  over a fine 
grid  (Ax =  0.01). In depicting  the adjustment  rate  function  in the first  panel, values  of x 
equal, or very close, to zero (that is,  between -0.02  and 0.02) are excluded, since 
calculating  the adjustment  rate  for a given  x involves  dividing  the rate  of investment  by x. 
27.  It is also possible that, despite our efforts, we still have not captured  most of 
actual  capital  retirements,  and that this bias is increasing  with the size of capital  retire- 
ments. 22  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 8. Relationship  between  Investment  and Mandated  Investment 
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of desired capital) levels of mandated  investment, respectively. Al- 
though  there is substantial  noise in the construction  of these figures, it 
is still possible to see clear differences  between them. At high levels of 
mandated  investment,  most plants  invest;  for many  of them, investment 
is well over 50 percent of capital stocks. At low levels of mandated 
investment,  on the other hand, a large number  of firms  do not invest at 
all. Conditional  histograms  for negative  mandated  investment  look very 
much like the fourth  panel of figure 8. 
Fluctuations 
Figure 9 describes the time paths of the first four moments of the 
cross-sectional  distribution  of mandated  investment.  They are all quite 
volatile and are far from perfectly correlated.  In conjunction  with the 
nonconstant  (with respect  to deviations)  adjustment  function  illustrated 
in the first panel of figure 8, they all shape aggregate investment 
dynamics  .28 
Figure 10 shows the actual  path  of aggregate  (average  across  plants) 
investment-to-capital  ratios in the sample, as well as the counterfactual 
of replacing  the actual  adjustment  function  in equation  1 by the average 
adjustment  function over time (from the first panel of figure 8) while 
preserving the actual cross-section distributions. The difference be- 
tween the two paths is entirely due to fluctuations  in the adjustment 
function. From the proximity  of the two lines, it is apparent  that fluc- 
tuations in the cross-sectional density, driven by the history of plant- 
level shocks and the responses of plants to these shocks (that is, ad- 
justments), account for an important  fraction  of aggregate  investment 
fluctuations. 
It should be mentioned, however, that even though the difference 
between the two lines is not large, it is not negligible. The shifts in the 
adjustment  function  over time that  lie behind  this difference  may  largely 
reflect the omission of certain variables. They may, for example, rep- 
resent  a perception  that current  shocks are more or less persistent  than 
usual, or they may reflect the closely related effect of a generalized 
28.  The careful reader  may note that, contrary  to figures  6 and 7, figure  9 shows 
excess kurtosis  to be positive. The reason  is that  plant-level  mandated  investment  is not 
standardized  in figure 9.  The relative comparison  with figures 6 and 7  still holds, 
however: the nonstandardized  investment-to-capital  ratio exhibits excess kurtosis of 
more  than  one hundred. 24  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 9. Moments  of Mandated  Investment,  1973-88 
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Figure 10. Investment  Rate with Average  Adjustment  Rate, 1974-88 
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change in the confidence  of investors. Whatever  the structural  interpre- 
tation, it is interesting  to note that  during  election years changes in the 
adjustment  function had a significant impact on aggregate  investment 
fluctuations:  Given  mandated  investment,  both Presidents  Carter and 
Bush's elections coincide with periods when investors were more re- 
luctant  to invest, while President  Reagan's first  election coincides with 
a period of higher investment  than usual.29  Other  years when shifts in 
the adjustment  function seem to have contributed  significantly  to ag- 
gregate investment  dynamics are 1983 (negative) and 1986 (positive). 
The latter  observation  perhaps  reflects the fact that we have overesti- 
mated  the size of the negative surprise  in the permanent  component  of 
cost of capital. 
Figure 11 illustrates the actual path of the adjustment  functions; it 
also reproduces  the average adjustment  function of the first panel of 
figure 8. Given mandated  investment, it is apparent  that 1976 was a 
year of abnormally  high capital retirements  (or, investment  was below 
29.  There was a large positive profitability  shock in  1976 (see figure 5) which 
investors  may have interpreted,  correctly,  as mainly  transitory.  It is, however, puzzling 
that the bulk of  the shift in the adjustment  rates does not correspond  to less new 
investment  for given mandated  investment,  but instead is due to an increase  in retire- 
ments (or, investment  below maintenance  levels), as figure 11 shows. 26  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 11. Adjustment  Rates, by Year 
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Figure 12. Investment  Rate with No Current Cost of Capital Shock, 1974-88 
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maintenance  level), 1980 was a year of high new investment,  and 1988 
was a year  of low new investment.  It is also apparent  that  the adjustment 
function  became highly unstable  following the 1986 tax reform. 
Short-Run  Effect of Changes in Cost of Capital 
From  figure  5, which shows the large size of cost of capital shocks, 
and the large long-run elasticities obtained above, it is apparent  that 
cost of capital shocks have played a significant  role in investment  fluc- 
tuations  over the long run. One elusive issue is whether  these shocks 
have had a significant  role at higher  frequencies.  To assess this, figure 
12 compares  the actual  path  of the investment-to-capital  ratio  with what 
it would have been in the absence of aggregate  cost of capital shocks. 
The latter  path is obtained by making the "unwarranted"  assumption 
that neither the adjustment  function nor history is affected by the ex- 
periment.  This static  counterfactual,  therefore,  merely  amounts  to shift- 
ing the cross-sectional density in equation 1 by the current  cost of 
capital shocks or, equivalently, by substitutingf(x,t) in equation 1 by 
the cross-section  that  would have resulted  if the cost of capital  in period 
t had been equal to the actual cost of capital in the preceding  period, 
plus the average  change in this cost. 28  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 12 reveals that the 1981 tax reform  played a significant  role 
in boosting investment, but the 1986 tax reform had a much more 
dramatic  detrimental  effect on investment  during  the second half of the 
1980s. Indeed, in the absence of the cost of capital shock of 1986, the 
investment  rate would have been more than 15 percent higher than it 
actually was.30 
Combining Plant- and Aggregate-Level Data: 
A Parametric Approach 
So far, this paper has used an extreme form of nonparametric  ap- 
proach  to estimate  the adjustment  function  that  perfectly  fits all aspects 
of the cross-sectional distribution  of investment-to-capital  ratios. This 
section follows an entirely different approach.  We start by changing 
the metric; we are only concerned with fitting the path of aggregate 
(sectoral)  investment-to-capital  ratios, and do so with a time-invariant 
parametric  estimate  of the adjustment  function.  For  this we approximate 
the adjustment  function in equation 1 by a fourth-degree  polynomial 
with a constant term that is free to vary across two-digit sectors, and 
higher-degree  terms that are common across sectors:31 
4 
(6)  Ai(x,t)  =  aO,i +  E  akX  . 
k =  I 
Substituting  the above expression into equation 1 (and allowing for a 
free, sector-specific  constant)  leads to 
4 
(7)  Iit  = cOJ +  aoiMi!, +  E  akM1kt+,, 
k =  I 
where M,'t+'  denotes the (k  +  1)-th moment of the cross-section of 
mandated  investment  in sector i during  period t. 
Equation  7 relates sectoral (aggregate)  investment  data on the left- 
30.  The investment-to-capital  ratio would have been 14.4 percent  rather  than the 
actual 12.5 percent.  Needless to say, this is just a partial  equilibrium  experiment. 
31.  The results do not change significantly for working with a second- or sixth- 
degree  polynomial;  nor for eliminating  the sectoral  variation  in the adjustment  function; 
nor  for reweighting  the sectors  by the inverse  of the standard  deviations  of their  residuals. R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  29 
Figure  13. Time-Invariant  Adjustment  Rate Function  Based  on Moments 
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Source: Authors' calculations using data from the LRD. 
hand side to the first five moments of sectoral mandated  investment 
rates as regressors. We estimate this set of equations using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). Figure 13 portrays  the average (across sectors) 
adjustment  function obtained. Interestingly, it is qualitatively  similar 
to the average  adjustment  function  portrayed  in the first  panel of figure 
8, which was estimated  by an entirely different  procedure.  As before, 
the adjustment  function is clearly increasing  for capital shortages  and 
close to zero for retirement  decisions. 
The  Role of Nonlinear Adjustment  Functions 
Figure  14 presents  an example  with two hypothetical  cross-sections  of 
mandated  investment  rates immediately  before adjustments  take place. 
The cross-section  concentrated  toward  the right  reflects  a history  of larger 
recent  shocks (expansion)  than  the cross-section  concentrated  to the left. 30  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 14. Interaction  of Nonlinear  Adjustment  Function  with Aggregate  Shocks 
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Source: Authors' calculations using data from the LRD. 
For expositional  purposes, figure 14 assumes that the difference  in the 
histories  underlying  the two cross-sections  is due  only to the last  aggregate 
shock;  for this reason  the cross-sections  are  shifted  versions  of each  other. 
The purpose  of this figure  is to illustrate  one instance  in which  the nonlin- 
ear nature  of the adjustment  function  matters.  Aggregate  investment  in- 
creases  with  the size of a (positive)  aggregate  shock  for two reasons.  First, 
as in linear  models, a larger  shock  leads  to larger  average  adjustments  by 
individual  plants. Second, after  a large  shock  there  is a higher  concentra- 
tion of plants  in the region  where  the adjustment  function  increases  more 
steeply;  thus  not only do plants,  on average,  adjust  more, but  the number 
of plants adjusting  more is also larger. The latter  effect, which is not 
present  in linear models, explains why increasing  adjustment  functions 
matter  most after  large  shocks. 
To examine how the nonlinear adjustment  function behaves when 
accumulated  shocks are large, we sort the residuals  of each sector by 
the size of their  absolute  deviation  from  median  investment  for both  the 
semiparametric  estimate of the adjustment  function (increasing  adjust- R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  31 
Figure 15. Normalized  Differences  of the Sums of Squared Residuals 
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Source: Authors' calculations using data from the LRD. 
ment) and the estimate of the constant adjustment  function (partial 
adjustment)  obtained  by setting  ak equal  to zero in equation  6, for values 
of k from one through  four, and reestimating  the remaining  parameters 
by OLS. Figure 15 plots, from left to right, the sum across sectors of 
the differences  between  the squared  residuals  corresponding  to the larg- 
est investment  deviations for the partial  adjustment  and increasing  ad- 
justment  functions, the sum of the differences between squared  resid- 
uals corresponding  to the second largest investment  deviation, and so 
on. Each one is normalized  by the standard  deviation  of the difference 
in squared  shocks. It is apparent  that  the difference  between  the sum of 
squared  residuals  (SSR) is large  for the largest  investment  episodes and 
decreases  with the size of investment  deviations, showing that  the non- 
constant adjustment  function model matters most during periods of 
large accumulated  shocks. 
In contrast  to linear models with fixed parameters,  adjustment  func- 32  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
tion models have the flexibility to capture,  in a simple and  parsimonious 
manner, changes in the aggregate responsiveness to shocks over the 
business cycle.  This flexibility can be illustrated  by calculating the 
marginal  response (MR)  of the aggregate  investment-to-capital  ratio to 
aggregate  shocks:32 
(8)  MR=  fA(x,t)[I +  e(x,t)]f(x,t)dx, 
where e(x,  t) denotes the elasticity of the adjustment  rate at time t with 
respect  to mandated  investment  x. The first  term  on the right-hand  side is 
also present in constant  adjustment  function (linear)  models, although 
without  x as an argument:  it is equal  to the  fraction  of mandated  investment 
that actually takes place, on average. The second term is a weighted 
average  of mandated  investment  elasticities,  with weights  proportional  to 
the contribution  to aggregate  investment  of plants  with  different  mandated 
investment  rates. Figure 16 portrays  the path of the average  marginal 
response  of investment  across  sectors  after  suppressing  the  exogenous  time 
variation  in the adjustment  function.  It is apparent  that  these changes  are 
important,  even at the most aggregate  level. 
Figure 17 depicts the relative contribution  of the time-varying  mar- 
ginal response. The conceptual  experiment  underlying  this figure  is the 
decomposition  of the difference between actual  investment  and invest- 
ment in the absence of the current  shock into a linear  component  and a 
nonlinear  component  that is equal to zero with a constant adjustment 
function. The figure illustrates  the ratio of the nonlinear  to the linear 
component. A positive value reflects an amplification  effect, while a 
negative value reflects an off-setting effect. The impact of the time- 
varying marginal  response appears  to be especially large during 1986; 
the decline in investment  is 20 percent  greater  than  it would have been 
in the absence of the nonlinear  component.33 
32.  Recalling that v is linear in the log of the aggregate shock, this amounts  to 
calculating  dI,/dv evaluated  at v =  v,. The derivation  is provided  in appendix  C. 
33.  In comparing  figures 16 and 17, the relevant  marginal  response  of investment  to 
shocks for figure 17 lies somewhere  between  those depicted  for 1985 and 1986 in figure 
16. That is, the marginal  response  depicted  in figure 16 for 1986 (1985) represents  the 
marginal  response  after the shock in 1986 (1985). It is worth  noting  that  this finding  of 
a large  effect from  the 1986 tax reform  is related  to, but  quite  different  than,  the findings 
of Cummins,  Hassett, and Hubbard  (1994). They find evidence of a large effect on the 
cross-sectional  pattern  of investment  from the cross-sectional  changes in taxes imme- R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  33 











0.075  - 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  1 
1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from the LRD. 
a. The Y-axis gives  the effect of doubling the cost of capital on the investment-to-capital ratio. 
Conclusion 
This paper started  on a pessimistic note and concludes on a more 
positive one. Despite the simplicity  of the "almost accounting"  frame- 
work used, it has yielded a view on U.S. equipment  investment  that is 
not at odds with common sense: 
-There  are large long-run  elasticities of investment  with respect  to 
cost of capital. These vary  from  about -0.01  for transportation  to -  2.0 
for textiles, with an average of around -  1.0, the neoclassical bench- 
mark. 
-Over  the short run, the responses are substantially  smaller and 
diately after  tax reforms, including  the 1986 reform. In contrast,  our result shows that 
there  is a large  impact  on aggregate  investment  due to the 1986 reform,  induced,  in part, 
by the time varying  elasticity. 34  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure  17.  Relative  Contribution  of Time-Varying  Marginal  Response,  1974-88 
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Source: Authors' calculations using data from the LRD. 
variable  over time; they range from 0.07 to 0.12 of the corresponding 
long-run  elasticities.34 
-The  variability  of these aggregate  elasticities comes from  the non- 
linearity in microeconomic  policies. Plants invest a larger  fraction  of 
their  mandated  investment  rates when these rates  are large and  positive 
than when they are small or negative. 
-The  tax reforms  of the 1  980s had substantial  impact  on equipment 
investment:  positive in 1981 and large and negative from 1986. 
-The  effect of the 1986 reform  was exacerbated  by a large  elasticity 
with respect to shocks that had been brought  about by the preceding 
expansion. 
-Fluctuations  in microeconomic  policies also played a role in de- 
termining aggregate investment during the sample period. This was 
particularly  true during election years. Other things equal, investors 
34. After  suppressing  exogenous fluctuations  in the adjustment  function. R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  35 
were overly reluctant  when Presidents  Carter  and Bush were elected, 
and overly optimistic when President  Reagan was first  elected. 
There is plenty of space for improvement  on the approach  used in 
this paper. In technical terms, this would primarily  involve enriching 
the set of variables that characterize  the state of plants. Specifically, 
we pay too little consideration  to agency problems  and additional  dy- 
namic  factors  accruing  to time-to-build  and  other  sources  of inertia  after 
investment  decisions have been made. We leave no margin  for shocks 
of different  persistence  to affect the responses  of plants;  and  we treated 
the data as if they were measured  without noise. These are important 
factors and must be largely responsible for the fluctuations  in the mi- 
croeconomic  policies observed. 
APPENDIX  A 
Cross-Sectional  Dynamics 
THIS  APPENDIX provides explicit expressions for the evolution of the 
cross-section of mandated  investment  rates. The evolution of the den- 
sity of deviations during  period t is affected by three inputs. First, the 
initial density (the final density of the previous  period),f,(x,t  -  1), is 
convolved with the density of idiosyncratic  shocks, giving rise tof2(x, 
t  -  1). We let the density of idiosyncratic  shocks depend on initial 
deviations and denote it by g(v,t|x). Thus 
f2(x,t)  =  ff(x  -  v,t  -  I)g(v,t|x  -  v) dv. 
Second, there is an aggregate shock that shifts all units by v, in state 
space, yielding  f(x,t).  Third, denoting by X, and  Xl, the random  varia- 
bles corresponding  to f(x,t)  and  f1  (x,t), it follows that Xl,  =  X,(I  - 
J,), where Jt denotes the fraction of its mandated  investment  rate by 
which a plant  adjusts.  We denote the density of the Jt by a(j,t|x), which 
satisfies the constraint  A(x,t)  =  f ja(j,t|x)dj, and summarize  this last 
step by 36  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
f(x,  t)  =  f-a(i  -  u,tI)  f  ,t) du. 
APPENDIX  B 
Frictionless Capital 
LET Y REPRESENT the value of output  ("output") of an individual  plant. 
Imperfect  competition and fixed factors other than equipment  yield a 
decreasing  returns  output  function 
Y =  AK-FP,  y  +  < 1, 
where  A, K, and  F are indexes of productivity  and  contribution  of fixed 
factors, equipment  capital, and flexible factors, respectively. 
Optimizing  over flexible factors yields a profit  function 
11(K)  maxY  -  WFF, 
F 
where WF  is the price of  flexible factors. Frictionless capital is the 
argument  of the maximization  of this profit  function, 
K* =  argmaxjfl(K)  -  cK. 
Taking  the logarithm  of this expression, with some manipulation,  yields 
k*  -  k =  q{y  -  k -c, 
where -q  (1  -  4)/(1  -  y  -  4).  This equation corresponds  to 
equation  5, but in that case the constraint  that cost of capital  elasticity 
be the same as the output  elasticity was relaxed. This assumption  was 
viewed as responsible for the (to some, artificial)  significance of cost 
of capital in early estimations  of neoclassical equations.35 
Estimating -q is not an easy task, for it requires assumptions, or 
35.  Michael Woodford has pointed out to us that allowing this extra degree of 
freedom  may be inconsistent  with constant  values of q. It is therefore  comforting  that 
our estimates of the cost of capital elasticity are not very far from one, at least on 
average. R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  37 
guesses, about many intermediate  steps. In principle, it requires  esti- 
mates of the elasticity of demand  faced by the plant and of the fraction 
of factors that would be easily adjusted  if capital  were to change (flex- 
ible factors). Instead, we rewrite  -q  as 
1Y  -  +  1I/  -  a\/  X 
_  _  _ 
=  1 
1_  + 
_  _ 
where ot is the cost share of equipment  capital. Note that the approxi- 
mation 
(Bi)  N  1- 
is fairly good for a wide range of "reasonable" assumptions,  for ex- 
ample, if a  =  0.06,  the markup  is 30 percent, and the cost share of 
flexible factors is 0.7,  then the ratio of the exact value of -q and its 
approximation  is only 1.07.  Since equipment  cost shares are easy to 
compute, we use the approximation  in equation  B1. 
APPENDIX  C 
Marginal Response of Investment  to Shocks 
THIS APPENDIX derives equation  8. Denioting  byf*(x,t) the cross-section 
density before the aggregate  shock in period  t, we have that  equation 1 
implies that  aggregate  investment,  as a function  of the aggregate  shock, 
v, is equal to 
I, =  f  (x +  v)A(x +  v,t)f*(x,t)dx. 
Differentiating  with respect to v leads to 
(C1)  l,'(v)  =  f  [A(x +  v,t) +  (x +  v)A'(x +  v,t)]  f*(x,t)dx. 
Recalling  thatf*(x,t)  =  f(x  +  v,,t),  equation Cl  leads to 38  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
(C2)  I,'(v,) =  f  [A(x,t) +  xA'(x,t)]  f(x,t)dx. 
From  this, simple algebra  leads to equation  8. Equation  C2 shows that 
if A(x,t) is approximated  by a k-th degree polynomial in x,  then the 
marginal  response of investment  to aggregate  shocks can be calculated 
from by using the first (k +  1) moments of the cross-section of man- 
dated investment rates. Figures 16 and 17 are constructed  using this 
result. 
APPENDIX  D 
Data Appendix 
THE  CAPITAL STOCK series for equipment and for structures  for each 
plant are constructed  as follows.36  The real capital stock is initialized 
in 1972 by dividing the book value in 1972 by a two-digit-based  capital 
deflator.  The 1972 capital  deflator  is the ratio  of the current  dollar  book 
value in 1972 to the constant dollar value in 1972 for the two-digit 
industry,  in 1987 dollars. Starting  with the initial capital  stock, subse- 
quent values of  capital stock are created by using equation 3.  The 
expenditures  data on capital are deflated with four-digit, new capital 
deflators  from the Gray-Bartelsman  data. 
The in-use depreciation  rate and the real retirements  measure are 
constructed  as follows. Equations  2 and 3 together  yield 
(DI)  8a  =  8t  -  (R,/K,1). 
We implement  equation  DI at the two-digit level using BEA two-digit 
depreciation  rates to measure 8t. Note, however, that real retirements 
depend on the in-use depreciation  rate. That is,  real retirements  are 
given by 
(D2)  R,  E  (vjtlpij)(1 -  6")t-i, 
j=o 
36.  We construct  the capital stock for structures  in order  to be able to compute  the 
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where vj, is the component  of nominal retirements  in year t associated 
with capital purchases made in period j,  and pij is the new capital 
deflator  for period  j. Nominal retirements  are  explicitly available  in the 
LRD from 1977 to 1988. For the period before 1977, retirements  can 
be measured  from the identity relating  the change in book value from 
the beginning to the end of the period, expenditures,  and retirements. 
Equations  DI and D2 are used to solve for the in-use depreciation  rate 
at the two-digit level under the assumption  that each plant exhibits a 
FIFO retirement  pattern. The two-digit in-use depreciation  rates are 
then used with the new capital deflators,  plant-level  data, and equation 
A5 to measure  real retirements  at the plant-level. 
Additional details of the estimations of the terms and variables in 
equation 5 are as follows.  The value of output at the plant level is 
measured  by adding the nominal change in inventories  to the nominal 
total value of shipments, and then deflating by the four-digit output 
deflator from the Gray-Bartelsman  data. The capital cost shares are 
calculated  using the plant-level cost data on wages and salaries, mate- 
rials costs, energy costs, cost of contract  work, and  capital  costs. Cap- 
ital costs are measured  by using two-digit rental  prices from  the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and the constructed  plant-level capital stocks on 
equipment  and structures. 
The sample  used in this analysis  is drawn  from  all large, continuously 
operating  plants for the period 1972-88.  The sample terminates  in this 
year  because  retirements  were collected in the ASM until 1988. Further, 
a small number  of plants (about 100) are excluded from the analysis 
because the above procedures  yield extremely large investment  rates. 
Specifically, plants with negative investment rates in excess of  100 
percent in absolute magnitude (in principle, this is impossible) and 
those with positive investment rates in excess of 500 percent are ex- 
cluded. The results are not sensitive to the precise value of the cutoff 
for positive rates;  for example, the results are essentially the same for 
only excluding plants  with positive investment  rates in excess of 1,000 
percent. Comments 
and Discussion 
Michael Woodford: This is a very impressive  paper. I am impressed, 
first  of all, by the sheer size of the data  set that  the authors  have had to 
characterize  and the amount  of computational  effort that  has obviously 
been required,  both in computing  the parameters  of their model and in 
performing  the various simulation  exercises. 
I am also impressed  by the fact that two of the authors  studied the 
ability of this type of model to explain aggregate  investment  dynamics 
in an earlier paper that looked only at the properties  of (sectoral) ag- 
gregate series and concluded (on the basis of rather  indirect  evidence) 
that the model did well. ' I find it very courageous  of them to take on a 
coauthor  with a lot more data and actually look at the plant-level data 
to see if the model for which they had already  declared  victory would 
survive this much more intensive empirical  scrutiny. 
The results that the authors  find are quite striking. Their  framework 
for organizing  the data  brings into focus some very suggestive regular- 
ities. Indeed, the data appear  to be quite consistent with the general 
theoretical  framework  from which the authors  approach  the problem. 
However, the data  provide  much  more support  for some aspects  of their 
analysis than for others. 
The authors  argue that investment decisions at the microeconomic 
level have straightforward  determinants  (including an important  role 
for a Jorgensonian "cost  of capital"),  but that these relations are 
masked by aggregation, if one seeks to explain aggregate  investment 
in terms  of average  values of the shock variables.  Their  explanation  of 
1. Caballero  and Engel (1994). 
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why aggregation  is problematic  involves two elements. First, they argue 
that investment  is "lumpy"; adjustment  occurs at discrete  times at the 
plant level, even though one observes relatively continuous  variations 
in aggregate investment. Second, they argue that there is a nonlinear 
relationship  at the plant level between "mandated  investment" (the 
discrepancy  between the plant's desired and actual capital stocks) and 
the average  rate of investment  that results. In particular,  capital short- 
falls result in proportionally  greater  responses  than  do capital  excesses, 
as stressed in the literature  on the irreversibility  of investment. 
The results  presented  offer some support  for both of these sources  of 
aggregation  problems.  However, it is the evidence of nonlinearity  (and 
in particular,  asymmetry  of the kind associated  with irreversibility)  that 
is most striking.  The support  for discrete  adjustment  is much  less clear- 
cut. Specifically, it seems that the data do not support  a simple (S,s) 
model of discrete  adjustment  of the kind hypothesized  by Caballero  and 
Engel  .2 
This is worth commenting on because the great advantage  of the 
analytical  framework  in this paper  is that  it allows one to model discrete 
adjustments  of a relatively general sort. The main competing  approach 
in modern  work on investment, the "q-theoretic" approach  that esti- 
mates Euler equations for intertemporal  substitution of investment 
spending, can deal with irreversibility,  as long as investment  (although 
possibly intermittent,  in the sense that intervals of time pass with no 
investment)  is not discrete.3  Hence if irreversibility  is the main  obstacle 
to the validity of an aggregative model, a disaggregated  q-theoretic 
model might be appropriate,  rather than the disaggregated "partial 
adjustment"  model proposed  by the authors. 
Reviewing the main findings of the paper, the authors construct 
mandated  investment  levels for each plant in each year of their sample 
and compare these with the measured  levels of investment  spending. 
This requires  construction  of a capital stock series for each plant, and 
then a series for the plant's desired capital stock for each year. The 
indirect  method  used to construct  the latter  series is clever. It amounts 
to observing that each plant's output-to-capital  ratio and its cost of 
capital  are arguably  cointegrated,  although  neither  series is stationary, 
2.  See Caballero  and Engel (1994). 
3.  See Abel and Eberly  (1994). 42  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1995 
and  then interpreting  the stationary  linear  combination  of the two series 
as a measure  of mandated  investment. The idea is that in the absence 
of any costs of adjusting  one's capital stock, the output-to-capital  ratio 
would vary instantaneously  with variations in the cost of capital in 
exactly the way that the two series are observed  to comove in the long 
run. Thus any observed temporary  fluctuations  in the stationary  co- 
integrating  vector are attributed  to failure to adjust  the plant's capital 
stock immediately  to its desired level, and are taken  to be proportional 
to the discrepancy  between actual and desired capital. 
The authors  describe a special case in which this constructed  series 
would correctly  measure  mandated  investment,  although  they make no 
effort to demonstrate  that  their  data  are  consistent  with the implications 
of that special case. For example, the derivation  in Caballero  and En- 
gel's earlier paper relies upon the shock variables following random 
walks but no attempt  is made in the present  paper  to show that  they do 
so, even though series are constructed  for the shocks to each plant's 
desired capital.4 Similarly, the derivation  in appendix  B implies that 
equation  5 should hold with Oi  equal to -  1, but in the empirical  work 
0, is treated  as a free parameter;  the estimated  values used in construct- 
ing mandated  investment  series range  between -0.01  and -2.0.  (An- 
other problematic  feature of the use of values for 0, other than - 1 is 
that  if the cointegrating  relation  is really of that  sort, then there  should 
be no stationary "cost share of equipment  capital." Yet such a cost 
share is assumed to be measurable  for each sector and is used to cali- 
brate  the value of  i in equation  5.) 
The primary  case to be made  for the validity  of the proposed  measure 
of mandated  investment is that actual investment  is clearly related to 
it. This is shown in the second panel of figure 8 by the nonconstancy 
of the plot of the average  investment  rate  as a function  of the mandated 
investment  rate. Not only is the plot upward-sloping,  but many of its 
gross features are those that the authors' framework  would predict. 
Average investment is near zero when mandated  investment is near 
zero. The response to positive mandated  investment  is much stronger 
than the response to negative mandated  investment of the same size 
(indicating  an important  degree of irreversibility);  and the response to 
large positive values of mandated  investment  is larger  to an extent that 
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is more than proportional  to the increase in mandated  investment  (as 
would follow from a model of discrete adjustment  in which the in- 
creased profits from the adjustment  must be large enough to offset a 
fixed cost of adjusting). The plausible character  of this plot suggests 
that the authors' method does capture  some important  features  of the 
data. 
Still, it is important  to be clear about  what is not established  by this 
finding.  The authors  stress  that  their  estimates  suggest significant  effects 
of cost of capital variations  (and hence of tax incentives) upon invest- 
ment at the microeconomic  level, although  previous studies using ag- 
gregate data have typically failed to find them. But it is not clear how 
much evidence there is in their results of cost of capital effects. The 
second panel of  figure 8 shows a strong effect of their measure of 
mandated  investment, and that measure involves the cost of capital. 
But there is no demonstration  that the strong  relation  between average 
investment  and  mandated  investment  owes anything  to the way that  cost 
of capital variations  are used in constructing  the mandated  investment 
series. It seems likely that  most of the variation  in mandated  investment 
in the authors'  sample is due to variation  in the output-to-capital  ratio 
(over time and across plants), and that the relation found between 
mandated  and actual investment  largely has to do with the well-known 
ability of "accelerator" equations  to predict  investment. 
And the second panel of figure 8, in itself, provides little evidence 
in favor of the authors' hypothesis of discrete adjustment.  (Note that 
the asymmetry  of this plot is important  evidence in favor of irreversi- 
bility, and  hence of a need to go beyond  a simple  aggregative  framework 
in order  to account for variations  in aggregate  investment.)  They sug- 
gest that the convexity of the plot for positive values of mandated 
investment  (or equivalently, the fact that the adjustment  rate function 
is increasing  in the first  panel of figure  8) indicates "increasing  returns 
in the adjustment  technology." But a similar plot could equally well 
be generated by a model with convex adjustment  costs (and hence 
continuous  adjustment),  if the marginal  profits associated with an in- 
crease  in the capital  stock were sufficiently  steep at low levels of capital 
stock relative to output. 
The authors  also suggest that the skewness and excess kurtosis of 
the distribution  of plant-level investment  rates  (shown in the first  panel 
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level shocks (shown in the second panel of figure  6) has neither  prop- 
erty. But while this finding  surely indicates  a nonlinear response  to the 
shocks, it need not involve discrete adjustment.  In fact, a model of 
continuous  adjustment  with the kind of nonlinear  response  required  by 
irreversibility  could easily result in a distribution  of investment  rates 
with both properties. 
A simple example will illustrate  this. Suppose that a plant continu- 
ously adds to its capital stock, with an investment  rate i given by 
(E 1)  i  =  AeYx, 
where  A >  0, y >  0, and  x is mandated  investment.  Note that  equation 
El  is an increasing, convex function like the plot in the second panel 
of figure 8, and investment is never negative, in accordance  with the 
idea of irreversibility.  As in the text, mandated  investment  is given by 
(E2)  x=  k-k, 
where  k evolves in response  to exogenous shocks. Let  k follow a Brown- 
ian motion with drift, 
(E3)  dk =  otdt +  cdw, 
where w is a unit Wiener process. (Note that this implies that the 
distribution  of shocks is normal, as in the second panel of figure 6.) 
The evolution of the capital stock is finally given by 
(E4)  dk =  [i  -  8]dt. 
Equations  E1-E4 imply a law of motion  for mandated  investment  of 
the form 
dx  =  [ot +  8  -  Aeyx]dt +  cdw. 
The stationary distribution  for mandated  investment,  f(x),  therefore 
satisfies a diffusion equation  of the form 
[ot +  8  -  Aeyx]f(x) =  2fx). 
It follows that 
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where v -2(o  +  a)r2,  p =  2/  yo2,  and B >  0 is chosen so as to make 
f a probability  density. Transforming  variables  using equation  El,  the 
stationary  distribution  for the investment  rate, g(i), is given by 
(E5)  g(i)  =  C(i(VY-Y1w)e-Pi) 
over the range  i > 0, where  C > 0 is chosen so as to make  g a probability 
density. 
One observes that because of the nonlinearity  of relation El,  the 
normally distributed  shocks result, nonetheless, in a decidedly non- 
normal  distribution  of investment  rates (equation  E5). This distribution 
is easily seen to exhibit skewness and excess kurtosis, as in the first 
panel of figure 6. Yet there are no large, discrete adjustments  in the 
hypothesized  investment  dynamics-simply  a large continuous  rate of 
investment  in the case of a large capital shortfall. 
The only direct evidence that the authors  report  relating  to the dis- 
creteness  of adjustment  is the distributions  of investment  rates  reported 
in the third and fourth  panels of figure 8. Here they present  complete 
histograms  for the distribution  of investment  rates observed  for plants 
with a particular  level of mandated  investment, rather  than simply the 
average investment  rate as in the second panel of figure 8. These his- 
tograms  are suggestive of discrete adjustment  in that in both cases the 
largest bin is the one that includes zero investment. This remains  true 
even when mandated investment is large, although in that case the 
probability  of zero investment  falls and large positive investment  rates 
become more  frequent.  Certainly  the histograms  are  not consistent  with 
the simplest sort of continuous adjustment  model, under which one 
would expect the investment rates always to cluster tightly around  a 
modal  rate  that  tracks  the average  investment  rate  plotted  in the second 
panel of figure 8. 
At the same time, they do not much suggest a simple (S,s)  model of 
the kind hypothesized in Caballero  and Engel's earlier paper, for the 
nonzero investment rates do not cluster around  a single value corre- 
sponding to "full adjustment."5  (In this respect, the results here are 
rather  different than those reported  in the authors' companion paper 
that  deals with employment  adjustment.  In that  paper, the correspond- 
ing histograms  do often have two sharp  peaks, at zero and full adjust- 
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ment, respectively  .6)  Instead,  the most frequent  positive investment  rate 
continues to be the smallest one, even when mandated  investment is 
large;  and frequency  falls off nearly  monotonically  with the size of the 
investment  rate, in the case of both positive and negative rates. 
These histograms  do not much suggest any tendency of investment 
to be lumpy, and certainly  not a tendency  to occur in lumps  of the size 
of the authors'  measure  of mandated  investment. Rather,  they instead 
suggest a process of intermittent  continuous  investment.  Because there 
are  frequent  spells of zero investment,  the zero bin is the most frequent. 
But when investment is observed during a year, the total investment 
over the year is often small (because much of the year may have con- 
sisted of spells of zero investment), and so the small-investment  bins 
are the next most frequent, and so on. A large cumulative  investment 
over the year  would be observed  only when the incentive  for investment 
becomes so large that investment  occurs continuously  at a significant 
rate over the entire year. If the measure  of mandated  investmenit  were 
only a very noisy proxy  for plants' actual  incentives  to invest each year, 
then one would expect a distribution  of outcomes in the case of a given 
measured  value of mandated  investment that would always include a 
sizable number  of plants with zero investment, although  fewer when 
mandated  investment  is measured  to be high. 
Intermittent  continuous investment of  this sort is predicted by a 
model with convex costs of adjustment  combined with irreversibility 
(for example, a lower price for sales of capital than for purchases),  as 
shown by Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck, and Andrew Abel and 
Janice Eberly.7  Thus an important  order  of business remains  the deter- 
mination  of the extent to which a model of that type, rather  than one 
emphasizing discrete adjustment,  can account for the patterns  in the 
plant-level data that are identified  by the authors. 
None of this detracts  from the importance  of the authors'  conclusion 
that  because the response  of actual investment  to mandated  investment 
is significantly  nonlinear,  one cannot  hope to explain aggregate  invest- 
ment solely in terms of the average values of the various variables 
involved in the model. Their findings  do suggest significant  nonlinear- 
ities in investment  dynamics, and  of an intuitively  plausible  sort. These 
6.  See Caballero,  Engel, and Haltiwanger  (1995). 
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appear  to result, on the one hand, from a greater  difficulty  in shedding 
capital than in acquiring  it, and on the other, from a greater  marginal 
benefit  from acquiring  capital  when the capital  shortfall  becomes large. 
Insofar  as this is true, it is unavoidable  that  the sensitivity  of aggregate 
investment  to shocks will vary  over time, as the authors  argue, and  that 
an adequate  model of investment dynamics will have to track higher 
moments of the distributions  of various state variables, as they here 
propose. 
Robert E. Hall: Ricardo Caballero, Eduardo  Engel, and John Halti- 
wanger break  a tremendous  amount  of new ground  in the field of em- 
pirical  research  on investment.  Although  advances  in investment  theory 
have been impressive in recent years, until this paper  empirical  appli- 
cations have been disappointing. 
The accomplishment  shown in figure  8 is nothing  short  of breathtak- 
ing. In the first panel, the vertical position of the curve is the ratio of 
actual  investment  to the amount  of investment  mandated  by investment 
theory, averaged over all of the plants in a category of mandated  in- 
vestment that is one percentage point wide. Mandated  investment is 
positive to the right of the vertical line and negative to the left. Plants 
with high levels of mandated  investment  actually  invest almost 30 per- 
cent of the mandated  amount. The adjustment  rate falls to around 10 
percent if  mandated investment is  small but positive. Remarkably, 
plants with low levels of mandated  disinvestment  have actual disin- 
vestment that is also around 10 percent of the mandated  amount. But 
the adjustment  rate for high levels of mandated  disinvestment  is in the 
range  of 3 to 5 percent. 
The second panel of figure  8 shows investment  itself, in place of the 
investment  rate in the first panel. The nonconstancy  of the investment 
rate  is shown as convexity of investment.  There  is a little mystery  here, 
not explained in the text. Investment  is positive, on the average, for 
plants with small negative levels of mandated  investment. The corre- 
sponding  adjustment  rate ought to be large and negative, but is shown 
in the graph  as moderate  and positive. 
The nonlinearity  found in figure 8 gives strong support  to modern 
investment  theory. Plants are expanded  fairly aggressively when man- 
dated investment  is positive, but to shrink  a plant when mandated  in- 
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order  issue for investment. To put it differently, the bid-ask spread  for 
industrial  equipment  is extremely high. 
Two other figures strongly confirm  the validity of the specification 
and  the importance  of the nonlinearity.  First, the model is well specified 
if the measured adjustment  functions are stable over time, and the 
explanation of  the time-series behavior of  investment comes from 
changes in mandated  investment  and movements  along the adjustment 
function. Figure 10 shows that freezing the adjustment  function over 
time robs  the model of relatively  little of its explanatory  power. Second, 
the ideas in the paper are important  if a good fraction  of the volatility 
of investment  comes from movements along the nonlinear  adjustment 
function. Figure 17 shows the importance  of these movements  relative 
to the movements  caused by changes in mandated  investment. 
One of the big contributions  of this paper is to make use of census 
data  on capital  retirements.  The authors  assume, as does the BEA, that 
capital depreciates  in use but still has positive marginal  product  when 
it is scrapped. Retirements  include sales of equipment,  where that as- 
sumption  makes sense. For true retirements  depreciation  is, presum- 
ably, already  complete. In fact, equipment  that  is no longer in use may 
remain  in the factory  for many  years before it is removed  to make  room 
for new equipment. 
The introduction  to the paper  suggests that  the authors  do something 
quite interesting:  study purchases  of new equipment  and  retirements  of 
old equipment  separately. In fact, the only variable  that they consider 
is purchases  less retirements.  Thus in figure 8 the positive adjustment 
rate  on the disinvestment  side means  that  retirements  exceed purchases. 
Haltiwanger, in his highly productive collaboration with Steven 
Davis, has become famous for developing an indirect  measure  of gross 
changes in employment. The Davis-Haltiwanger  measures  of job crea- 
tion and destruction  have taught analysts a tremendous  amount  about 
the operation  of the labor market.  This new knowledge is incremental 
to what we learned  from the difference between creation  and destruc- 
tion, net employment  change. I would love to see the same philosophy 
brought  to the investment  side. Even though it would raise more ques- 
tions than  it would answer, a new version  of figure  8 showing  separately 
the adjustment  rate for purchases  of equipment  and  that  for retirements 
would be an important  addition to the paper. There would likely be 
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investment. Firms may wait to retire  equipment  that is not in use until 
they need to make room for new equipment.  As a general matter, the 
separation  of the adjustment  functions for new purchases  and retire- 
ments may help to explain the role of reorganization  in the aftermath 
of recessions. 
The concept of mandated  investment  is central to the measurement 
exercise of this paper. Mandated  investment  is a throwback  to invest- 
ment theory of the 1960s. Just as Edmund  Phelps and Sidney Winter 
were writing in 1970 that "a landing on the non-Walrasian  continent 
has been made. Whatever  further  exploration  may reveal, it has been a 
mind-expanding  trip: We need never go back to p  =  cx(D -  S) and 
q =  min(D,S)," investment  theory  moved beyond the idea of defining 
disequilibrium  and then asserting  an adjustment  process driven  by that 
disequilibrium.'  The investment  theory of the 1970s assumed  convex 
adjustment  costs and showed that there was a simple relation  between 
the flow of investment  and  the value of a costate  variable,  usually  called 
q. Moreover, it was believed that q might be measurable  from data  on 
the market  values of firms, although  this idea has never worked  out, in 
practice. Even without direct measures of q, the Euler equation ap- 
proach  to investment  has flourished. 
More recent investment theory has assumed nonconvex costs, and 
therefore  has come to grips with infrequent  large adjustments  in the 
capital stock.2 The idea of a mandated  capital stock reappears  in this 
theory as a means of summarizing  the demand  facing the firm and the 
factor prices that it pays. Moreover, the mandated  capital stock does 
play a role in the adjustment  process, in that a firm  definitely will not 
adjust  today if its capital is close to the mandated  value. On the other 
hand, the adjustment  process itself takes a hammer-and-tongs  dynamic 
programming  analysis. The firm does not adjust mechanically to the 
mandated  level. It usually pays to overshoot, once adjustment  becomes 
appropriate. 
The mandated,  or desired, capital stock has proven  to be an elusive 
concept in investment  theory. Dale Jorgenson  was the first  to derive an 
expression  for desired capital, K*, when the technology admits  factor 
substitution.3  Jorgenson  posed the problem  of maximizing  the value of 
1. Phelps  and Winter  (1970, p. 337). 
2.  See Caballero  and Engel (1994). 
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a firm with a Cobb-Douglas technology. His model did not include 
adjustment  costs or time to build. As a result, his K* would hold for 
frictionless  investment.  He used the resulting  formula  in the framework 
mentioned  above: the firm adjusts  its capital stock toward  K*. 
Jorgenson's framework  suffers from two shortcomings. First, the 
value maximization  problem is ill posed for a competitive firm with 
constant  returns  to scale. The output  and  desired  capital  of such a firm, 
in this context,  is either infinite,  indeterminate, or zero. Second, 
Jorgenson  states K* as a function of the firm's output and the rental 
price of capital. When he evaluates K* he uses actual output, not the 
level of  output that the firm would have chosen in the frictionless 
setting. 
As a result, Jorgenson's  K* has the following rather  contorted  defi- 
nition: K* is the amount of capital that the firm would hold, absent 
frictions, if the wage were sufficiently different  so that the firm  would 
choose the same output  as it actually  produces, given the constraint  of 
the amount  of capital already  installed. 
In the subsequent literature on investment these issues are side- 
stepped, rather  than  solved. The problem  of value maximization  is well 
posed with constant returns  for a firm with adjustment  costs, and the 
concepts derived in the theory of investment  with adjustment  costs are 
easy to match with their empirical counterparts.  In the recent theory 
with nonconvex adjustment  costs and lumpy adjustment,  the problem 
of value maximization  has been made  well posed by assuming  imperfect 
competition. 
However, Caballero,  Engel, and Haltiwanger  use a concept of man- 
dated capital that is quite close to Jorgenson's  K*; it is about as con- 
torted. In their paper  K* is the amount  of capital that the firm would 
use if it first  optimized its use of variable  factors, given the amount  of 
capital currently  available, and then optimized its amount  of capital, 
taking as given the previously optimized levels of the variable  factors. 
This definition  makes K* dependent  on the last period's actual  capital 
stock, which may seem rather odd. But it does have the desirable 
property  that a firm  that  would make more  profit  with more  capital  will 
have K* in excess of its actual capital, and vice versa. 
There is no good answer to the K* conundrum.  That is, there does 
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quantity  dimension. Apparently  there is no good measure  in the price 
dimension, either.4 
The estimation of the elasticity of demand  for capital in the paper 
duplicates efforts in the vast empirical literature  on the estimation  of 
factor  demand.  The results seem to be consistent, but there  ought to be 
more discussion of the connection with these other studies. 
Finally, this paper  perpetuates  the Hall-Jorgenson  mistake  of talking 
about  the "effects" of tax policy.' Given what is being held constant, 
that  word  should  be banished.  What  is measured  is the shift in the firm's 
capital demand  function. 
But these are minor quibbles. This paper amply repays the effort 
needed  to understand  it. After decades  of complaining  about  the defects 
of aggregate  equations, someone has finally done something  construc- 
tive to disaggregate  investment. 
General Discussion 
Anil Kashyap  noted an interesting  implication  of the paper  for mon- 
etary  policy: In setting interest  rates, central  banks  should  take account 
of the underlying  distribution  of a firm's conditions. Minor  changes in 
interest  rates  might lead to large  investment  responses  when  many  firms 
are near an investment trigger, and lead to a much smaller response 
when many firms  have small, or even negative, discrepancies  between 
their desired and actual capital stock. For example, the central bank 
ideally should track not only the volume of new orders, but also the 
fraction  of firms that are placing them. 
Kashyap  also noted  that  the cost of capital,  as constructed  in the paper, 
assumes  that the real interest  rate is constant;  variations  in the cost of 
capital  come from differences  in taxes, depreciation,  and industry  price 
deflators.  He was skeptical  about  this assumption  and surprised  that, de- 
spite it, the results  are as good as they are. He encouraged  the authors  to 
explore  alternative  specifications  in which  the real  rate  varied  across  time, 
and  possibly  varied  by the size and  financial  structure  of firms. 
William Brainard  observed that in order to provide the rich distri- 
4.  See Caballero  and Leahy (1995). 
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butional information  on the discrepancy between desired and actual 
capital stock and on investment  conditional  on these discrepancies,  the 
authors  had sacrificed  information  about  dynamics, at both  the firm  and 
the aggregate levels. The simulations  of the effect of a change in the 
cost of capital on aggregate investment, for example, take the distri- 
bution of mandated  investment  as given and do not trace the implica- 
tions of the induced  investment  on the distribution  of mandated  invest- 
ment in future periods, which itself is a determinant  of investment  in 
subsequent  periods. Brainard  noted that, at the firm level, the model 
focuses on investment  one period in the future. Yet some investments, 
for example, those following from a decision to build an entire new 
plant  or production  facility, will be spread  out over several periods. In 
the same spirit, he noted that some investment  is undertaken  to meet 
expected  future  demand,  rather  than  in response  to low capacity  relative 
to current  output or to the retirement  or obsolescence of the existing 
capital stock. He wondered  whether  there  was any evidence in the data 
that investment "caused" output, rather  than the other way around. R. J. Caballero, E. M. R. A. Engel, and J. C. Haltiwanger  53 
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